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CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED EXEMPTIONS AND
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
GEOFFREY

R.

STONE*

The problem of constitutionally compelled exemptions has perplexed the Court at various points throughout its constitutional jurisprudence. The problem may arise in such diverse contexts as
freedom of speech, equal protection, and freedom of religion.
Stated simply, a constitutionally compelled exemption exists
whenever a facially constitutional law is held unconstitutional only
as applied to particular groups or individuals because of the incidental effect of the law on the constitutional rights of those challenging it.1
The Court has three alternatives when faced with a law that has
an incidental effect on constitutional rights. First, it may disregard
the incidental effect and uphold the law in its entirety. This is the
Court's most common response. In Washington v. Davis,2 for example, the Court rejected the claim that a qualifying test administered to applicants for positions as police officers violated the
equal protection clause because it had a disparate impact on black
applicants. In United States v. O'Brien,3 the Court rejected the
claim that a federal statute prohibiting any person from destroying
a draft card violated the freedom of speech because it prohibited
individuals from burning their draft cards to symbolize their opposition to the draft. And in United States v. Lee,4 the Court rejected the claim that a federal statute requiring employers to pay
Social Security taxes violated the free exercise clause because it
compelled payments from the Amish, whose religion forbade the
payment of such taxes. The soundness of this first alternative
* Harry Kalven, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1. For a general analysis of constitutionally compelled exemptions, see Stone & Marshall,
Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the First Amendment, 1983 Sup.
CT.REv. 583.
2. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
3. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
4. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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turns, in each case, on the nature and severity of the effect on constitutional rights, the strength of the government interests, and the
cost of invalidation.
The Court's second alternative is to invalidate the law in its entirety. In Martin v. City of Struthers,5 for example, the Court invalidated a restriction on the door-to-door distribution of leaflets
in part because the challenged law had a disproportionate impact
upon those who, for reasons of finances or ideology, did not have
access to more conventional means of communication. Similarly, in
Anderson v. Celebrezze,8 the Court invalidated restrictions on filing deadlines for access to the ballot in part because such deadlines fell unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates.
Martin and Anderson are rarities. In general, the Court is quite
reluctant to adopt this second alternative. This reluctance is understandable. In most instances, laws that have only an incidental
effect on constitutional rights impair such rights in only a very
small percentage of their total applications. In cases like O'Brien
and Lee, for example, the vast majority of all applications of the
challenged laws did not implicate the freedoms of speech or religion in any way. In such circumstances, total invalidation would
prevent government from achieving legitimate interests in the
large number of situations involving no intrusion on constitutional
rights. The cost of total invalidation in such circumstances might
substantially outweigh the benefit.
The Court's third alternative is to create a constitutionally compelled exemption-that is, to hold the law invalid only insofar as it
actually impairs constitutional rights. The Court occasionally
adopts this approach. In Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Committee, for example, the Court held that, although government could constitutionally compel most political parties to disclose the names of campaign contributors, it could not constitutionally apply this law to the Socialist Workers Party, which
would have been especially adversely affected by the disclosure

5. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
6. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
7. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
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requirements. Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,' the Court held
that, although government could constitutionally require children
of most religious faiths to attend school until the age of sixteen, it
could not constitutionally apply this requirement to the Amish,
whose religion prohibits them from sending their children to high
school.
At first blush, this third alternative may seem a perfect middle
ground. But it poses two significant difficulties. First, constitutionally compelled exemptions may create preferences that directly undermine the very constitutional guarantees that they are designed
to protect. Suppose, for example, that in Davis the Court had
adopted a constitutionally compelled exemption and had held that
the government could use the qualifying test for white applicants
but not for black applicants. This result would have created an
express racial distinction between black and white applicants that
might have been more threatening to the concerns underlying the
equal protection clause than the challenged policy itself. Similarly,
in Brown, the Court adopted a constitutionally compelled exemption that granted preferential treatment to the Socialist Workers
Party but not to the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, the
Libertarian Party, the Liberal Party, or the Conservative Party. In
effect, the Court converted a content-neutral law into one based on
viewpoint. In so doing, it turned topsy-turvy the usual presumptions of free speech jurisprudence. 9 And in Yoder, the Court
adopted a constitutionally compelled exemption that granted preferential treatment to the Amish but not to Jews, Catholics, Episcopalians, Buddhists, or "Moonies." In effect, the Court converted
a law that was neutral with respect to religion into one that treated
one religion differently from all others, in seeming conflict with the
central premise of the Court's establishment and free exercise
jurisprudence. 10

8. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
9. For further discussion of Brown, see Stone & Marshall, supra note 1.
10. Note that not all constitutionally compelled exemptions have this effect. In O'Brien,
for example, a constitutionally compelled exemption for individuals who destroy their draft
cards as a means of expression would not have adopted an explicitly viewpoint-based distinction. In such circumstances, the use of constitutionally compelled exemptions obviously
is less problematic.
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Second, constitutionally compelled exemptions may necessitate
inquiries that may themselves undermine the very constitutional
guarantees that the exemptions are designed to protect. Had the
Court adopted a constitutionally compelled exemption in Davis, it
then would have become necessary to determine whether particular applicants seeking to take advantage of the exemption were
black or white. Such inquiries are constitutionally awkward, at
best. Had the Court adopted a constitutionally compelled exemption in O'Brien, holding that the government could not constitutionally punish individuals who destroyed their draft cards to symbolize their opposition to the draft, it then would have become
necessary to determine whether particular individuals seeking to
take advantage of the exemption were engaged in speech or were
mere impostors attempting to excuse otherwise unlawful conduct
with a belated plea of "free expression." And in Yoder, the Court's
adoption of a constitutionally compelled exemption has necessitated an inquiry into the sincerity of the professed religious belief
of individuals who seek to take advantage of the exemption.
These two concerns suggest not that constitutionally compelled
exemptions are unwarranted per se, but that they are more complex and more problematic than might appear at first. What initially seems like an ideal middle ground often may turn out to be
the least desirable of the three alternatives.
The Court's willingness to adopt constitutionally compelled exemptions has varied significantly depending on the constitutional
right at issue. It never has created a constitutionally compelled exemption in the equal protection context; it occasionally, but only
rarely, has created such exemptions in the free speech context; and
it frequently has created such exemptions in the free exercise context. The explanation lies in the Court's conception of the nature
of the rights themselves.
In its interpretation of the equal protection clause, the Court has
emphasized the issue of motivation. Although other factors, such
as stigma, may affect the analysis, the core concern of the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence is improper motivation.1 The
Court has essentially two ways to determine motiva-

11. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689
(1984).
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tion-presumption and direct proof. If a law expressly disadvantages blacks, the Court presumes that an improper motivation
tainted the legislative process and requires government to rebut
that presumption by proving that the racial classification is necessary to promote a compelling government interest, thus demonstrating that government would have adopted the classification
even in the absence of improper motivation. On the other hand, if
a law is facially neutral with respect to race, the Court presumes
proper motivation, or at least does not presume improper motivation, even if the law has a disproportionate impact on blacks. In
such circumstances, the Court requires the party challenging the
law on racial grounds to prove bad motivation. Although the Court
may treat disparate impact as evidence of improper motivation, it
does not regard that impact alone as sufficient either to establish
improper motivation or to require invalidation of the law.12 Under
this conception of the equal protection clause, a law that has only
an incidental disproportionate impact on one race, or other "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, does not for that reason alone infringe a constitutional right. Thus, the question of constitutionally
compelled exemptions need not be considered.
Suppose, however, that the Court found that a law having a disproportionate impact on blacks actually was motivated by constitutionally impermissible considerations. Would the appropriate
remedy be total invalidation or a constitutionally. compelled exemption? Interestingly, the very structure of equal protection analysis virtually precludes the use of constitutionally compelled exemptions. If government's interest in applying the law to whites is
less than compelling, the Court will opt for total invalidation
rather than create an expressly racial exemption. If government's
interest in applying the law to whites is compelling, the Court will
not find a bad motivation. As a result, the very nature of the constitutional right effectively moots the issue of constitutionally compelled exemptions.
Much of the Court's free speech jurisprudence, like its equal
protection jurisprudence, turns on considerations of inequality and
improper motivation. Indeed, the Court's emphasis on improper

12. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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motivation explains much of its core distinction between contentbased and content-neutral restrictions of speech. 3 As a consequence, most of the preceding analysis of the equal protection
clause applies as well to facially neutral laws that have an incidental effect on free speech. Insofar as such laws are challenged on
grounds relating to improper motivation, only proof of actual improper motivation will suffice. 4
Unlike the equal protection clause, however, the right to free
speech is not limited to considerations of inequality. To the contrary, a separate component of the right to free speech exists that
is wholly distinct from considerations of inequality and improper
motivation. Even content-neutral laws that do not pose issues of
inequality or improper motivation may violate the free speech
guarantee if they unreasonably restrict the opportunity for free expression. In Buckley v. Valeo,'5 for example, the Court invalidated
a federal statute restricting the amount of money individuals could
spend in support of political campaigns because such restrictions
constrict the total amount of free expression.
To what extent does this non-equality-based component of the
right to free speech require the creation of constitutionally compelled exemptions? In answering this question, the Court's analysis
of content-neutral restrictions may be helpful. When it assesses
the constitutionality of such restrictions, the Court balances several factors, one of which is the existence of alternative means of
communication. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc.,' for example, the Court upheld a Minnesota
State Fair rule prohibiting all peripatetic distribution of leaflets on
the grounds of the State Fair in part because the challenged rule
left open alternative means of expression. Similarly, in Buckley,
the Court upheld limitations on campaign contributions in part because the overall effect of the limitations merely was to require
candidates and contributors to shift to alternative means of financing and expression rather than to "reduce the total amount of

13. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
189 (1983).
14. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439
(1985); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
15. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
16. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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money potentially available to promote political expression."1 And
Justice Harlan made clear in his concurring opinion in O'Brien
that, although an incidental restriction upon free expression may
be invalid if it effectively prevents "a 'speaker' from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate," the restriction at issue posed no such problem. because
O'Brien "manifestly could have conveyed his message in many
ways other than by burning his draft card."1 8
The Court's emphasis on alternative means of communication
suggests that its conception of the right to free speech focuses primarily on the right to communicate effectively rather than on the
right to choose any particular means of communication. Under this
view, the free speech guarantee does not accord special protection
to the speaker's preference for one means of communication over
another, so long as the overall ability to communicate is not impaired. Although the Court may consider a speaker's preference for
a particular means of expression in deciding on the adequacy of
alternatives, it does not accord that preference appreciable independent constitutional significance.
This conception of the free speech guarantee is at least arguably
consistent with both the self-governance and self-fulfillment rationales for free expression. As Alexander Meiklejohn observed, the
critical concern under the self-governance rationale is that everything worth saying be said, not that each individual have a personal right to use the particular means of expression the individual
prefers. 9 And the critical concern under the self-fulfillment rationale is that all persons must have the opportunity to express their
autonomously formulated thoughts and opinions, not that all persons must have the opportunity to express those views by whatever
means they choose. Under the self-fulfillment rationale, the freedom effectively to express one's views, not the freedom to choose
the means by which one expresses those views, is central.
Given this conception of the free speech guarantee, it is not surprising that the Court only rarely has created constitutionally compelled exemptions from laws having only an incidental effect on

17. 424 U.S. at 22.
18. 391 U.S. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION

TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

(1948).
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free expression. The Court creates such exemptions only when the
incidental effect of the regulation significantly impairs the
speaker's ability to communicate effectively. Because most laws
having only an incidental effect on free expression leave open ample alternative means of communication, constitutionally compelled exemptions in the free speech context are few and far
between.
This understanding of the Court's free speech jurisprudence is
confirmed by the very nature of its decisions adopting constitutionally compelled exemptions. The only free speech cases in which
the Court has adopted such exemptions have involved circumstances in which the incidental effect was so severe that it could
have excluded particular ideas or viewpoints from public debate.
As the Court observed in Brown, for example, compelled disclosure
of the names of contributors to the Socialist Workers Party could
"cripple" the organization's "ability to operate effectively" and deter membership and contributions to such an extent that the
movement could not survive.20
In the free speech context, then, the Court creates constitutionally compelled exemptions only when the challenged law seriously
interferes with the ability of a group or individual effectively to
contribute to public debate. It does not create such exemptions
merely because the law prevents a group or individual from using a
preferred means of expression.2 1
In its free exercise jurisprudence, the Court frequently has
adopted constitutionally compelled exemptions. Indeed, in cases
such as Yoder, Sherbert v. Verner,22 and Thomas v. Review
Board,23 the Court has held that laws having only an incidental
effect on religion cannot be applied to religious activity unless they
serve important or compelling government interests and are narrowly drawn to serve those interests.

20. 459 U.S. at 98. The Court has created a constitutionally compelled exemption in the
free speech context in only two other cases: Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960), and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
21. See Stone & Marshall, supra note 1, at 607-13. For a more thorough analysis, see
(1987) (forthcoming).
Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 22. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
23. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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Why is the Court so much more willing to adopt constitutionally
compelled exemptions under the free exercise clause than under
the free speech clause? Why, in other words, is the Court so much
more troubled by a law that requires Amish parents to send their
children to school than by a law that prohibits draft protesters
from burning their draft cards? The answer, again, turns on differences in the nature of the rights.
As we have seen in the free speech context, the Court does not
accord much constitutional importance to the desire of a speaker
to burn a draft card so long as alternative means of expression remain available. In the Court's view, a law that incidentally prevents speakers from using their preferred means of expression does
not pose a serious threat to freedom of expression. In the free exercise context, however, the Court attaches considerable importance
to the desire of Amish parents not to send their children to school.
Even a law that only incidentally interferes with this desire poses a
serious threat to freedom of religion. The Court, in other words,
gives greater protection to religious choice than to expressive
choice. The Court views the choice in the speech context as one
made independently by the speaker. It is a tactical and strategic
preference. The Court views the decision in the religion context
differently. It is made not as a matter of preference, but as a matter of duty to higher authority. If government requires Amish parents to send their children to school, it is not frustrating a mere
tactical or strategic preference, but compelling conduct that is incompatible with religious duty. Unlike the conflict between law
and preference in the free speech context, the Court sees the conflict between law and duty in the religion context as cutting to the
very core of the free exercise guarantee. This difference explains
the Court's greater willingness to adopt constitutionally compelled
exemptions under the free exercise clause.
Several observations follow more or less directly from the preceding analysis. First, in light of the rationale for constitutionally
compelled exemptions under the free exercise clause, the Court
should create such exemptions only if the challenged law requires
conduct that is directly incompatible with religious duty. Mere
preference is not enough. Constitutionally compelled exemptions
are constitutionally problematic. They should be reserved for cases
of genuine conflict between legal and religious duty.
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Second, although the Court is more willing to adopt constitutionally compelled exemptions in the free exercise context than in
the free speech context, the difference should not be exaggerated.
The Court frequently states that laws having even an incidental
effect on religious activity must pass strict scrutiny. If one looks to
the Court's results rather than to its rhetoric, however, one sees
that the actual scrutiny is often far from strict. Only a most diluted form of strict scrutiny could have produced the results in
Lee, Jensen v. Quaring,24 and Goldman v. Weinberger.2 5 In truth,
the Court's analysis in the free exercise context reflects intermediate scrutiny, at most.
Third, in considering the necessity for constitutionally compelled exemptions, the Court should pay careful attention to the
constitutional dangers of such exemptions: the creation of express
preferences for certain religous faiths; the need to inquire into
sincerity; and the risk of "coercing, compromising, or influencing
religious beliefs. ' 26 On the other hand, the Court must recognize
that the adoption of constitutionally compelled exemptions does
not produce an "irreconcilable tension" 27 between the free exercise
and establishment clauses. Rather, the perceived tension can be
eliminated without any sacrifice of principle simply by interpreting
"the establishment clause to prohibit all statutes that have a religious purpose, except for statutes with the purpose of accommodating religion in ways required by the free exercise clause."2 8
Finally, it is worth noting the special embarrassment that exists
when free speech and free exercise claims coalesce. In Heffron, for
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a State Fair rule

24. 472 U.S. 478 (1985), aff'g by an equally divided Court per curiam Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding a state rule requiring photographs on all
driver's licenses, as applied to a person whose sincerely held religious beliefs forbade her to
be photographed).
25. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) (upholding an Air Force regulation prohibiting the wearing of
unauthorized headgear while on duty, as applied to an Orthodox Jew who was ordered not
to wear a yarmulke).
26. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 948 (1986).
27. See id. at 947-48.
28. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion
Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 1007 (1986). For a similar analysis in the free speech
context, see Stone & Marshall, supra note 1, at 602-04.

1986]

CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED EXEMPTIONS

prohibiting peripatetic distribution of leaflets on the grounds of
the Fair unconstitutionally restricted the Krishnas' religious practice of sankirtan, a religious ritual which enjoins members of the
Krishna faith to go into public places to distribute religious literature. The Minnesota court therefore adopted a constitutionally
compelled exemption granting the Krishnas a special right to leaflet on the fairgrounds.2 9 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court maintained that "religious organizations [do
not] enjoy rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the
fairgrounds superior to those of other organizations having social,
political, or other ideological messages to proselytize."3 0 The Court
therefore applied conventional public forum analysis and held that
the challenged rule was a reasonable time, place, and manner regu31
lation of expressive activity.
The Court's unwillingness in Heffron to treat free exercise rights
differently from free speech rights can be explained on one of two
grounds. First, the Court may have assumed that, although
sankirtanis a religious duty, the Krishnas had no duty to perform
sankirtan on the grounds of the State Fair. Under this view, the
free exercise claim is based on a preference rather than a duty and
thus should be treated no differently from a conventional free
speech claim. This, of course, is consistent with the view of the free
exercise clause suggested above.
Second, the Court may have been loathe to grant a preference to
religious activity that is not granted to essentially identical political activity. Although such a result would seem to flow naturally
from the differences in the Court's free exercise and free speech
jurisprudence, the Court's reluctance to reach this result is evident
not only in Heffron, but also in a host of other decisions. The
Court's arguably problematic3 2 reliance on the establishment
rather than the free exercise clause in Larson v. Valente,33 for example, perhaps best can be explained by the Court's unwillingness
to grant a special exemption to religious activity that would not be

29. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79
(Minn. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
30. 452 U.S. at 652-53.
31. Id. at 654-55.
32. See Choper, supra note 26, at 958-60.
33. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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granted to essentially identical political activity. Similarly, the
Court's reliance on the free speech clause rather than the free exercise clause in cases like West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette34 and Wooley v. Maynard35 may reflect its discomfort
with the prospect of granting a special exemption to religious but
not political objectors. The real tension posed by the Court's free
exercise jurisprudence, then, ultimately may lie not in its conflict
with the establishment clause, but in its seemingly justified but
nonetheless discomforting grant of greater protection to religious
expression than to political expression. 8

34. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
35. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
36. For recent analysis of free exercise and free speech values, see Lupu, Keeping the
Faith:Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution,18 CONN. L. REv. 739 (1986);
Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779 (1986).

